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[Vol. 09 No. 04 G E R M A N L A W J O U R N A L making evolutionary theory "our own discipline," by elevating evolutionary theory from the status of "cousin" to one of "sibling" (or at least "in-laws") of the legal family. The focus in particular is to understand why, despite the fact that the evolutionary theory approach to law (or "evolutionary theory and law") has been present quite a while in the legal scholar's discussion, the legal world at large has left it at the front step of the legal house. 2 Based on this analysis, the task is also to evaluate whether it is possible, after certain adjustments, to invite evolutionary theory into the larger family of legal thinking, in particular as part of the legal theories of law-making (as "legal evolutionary theory").
This article, comprising five parts, starts with a brief clarification of certain concepts used in this work. The second part presents certain essential aspects of how evolutionary theory has a research program similar to the one each legal theoretical approach has to law-making. The centerpiece of this work, the third and fourth parts, proceeds to point out not only how legal theory and evolutionary approach can be functional with respect to each other, but also why evolutionary theory, though having been around for such a long time, has never been fully accepted by the legal world. The reason is found in particular in the tendency of most evolutionary approaches to produce only descriptions of legal evolutions (also including predictions of possible future paths of development), while neglecting one fundamental component essential and invoked by legal actors: the normative component. Finally, the fifth part highlights that the adjustment suggested in this work does not aim at radically changing the very nature of the evolutionary approach. On the contrary, all three steps characterizing the change of the law according to the current evolutionary theory (variation, selection and retention) reserve to the normative proposals a fundamental role.
Before beginning the investigation, a final clarification as to the goal of this article has to be pointed out. As stressed by many critiques, it is possible to detect in most of the evolutionary approaches to the law some hidden normative components. 3 For example, when using statements such as "legal uniformity… should to a large extent come about in an organic way," evolutionary scholars implicitly assume a normative proposal (i.e. that "the organic way ought to be pursued") while, at the As to that which legal theory aims to explain and clarify, it has to be pointed out that legal theory can traditionally be categorized as either descriptive (or positive) legal theory, when explaining what the law is (and the reasons and effects of this definition), or normative legal theory, where its main target is that what the law ought to be. 7 However, this separation has progressively disappeared in recent decades; nowadays, most legal theories comprise a descriptive and normative component. Due in particular to the critiques of the idea of "description" as developed by critical legal theories and Ronald Dworkin, all the major legal schools incorporate in their theoretical frameworks both a description of what law is (descriptive component) and a prescription of what law ought to be (normative component). 8 Contemporary legal theory varies considerably as to what kinds of ideal-models the law ought to aim for (e.g. economic efficiency, consistency, justice); moreover, differences remain as to the goal of legal theory being the description of the "normative" proposals legal actors ought to follow (as for the modern versions of legal positivism) or the prescription of those proposals (as for Critical Legal Studies). 9 In any case, normative proposals in general are a necessary 7 XXI (1907 XXI ( [1789 ) with their famous distinction between a "censorial" or "normative" jurisprudence (focused on the law as that which ought to be) and an "expository" or "analytical" jurisprudence (studying what the law is). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 457, 457-460 (1897) . But see Simon Deakin, Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics, 55 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1, 36 (2002) as to the different meaning attached to the term "normative" by the evolutionary theory's scholars, i.e. as purely descriptive of the binding character of the law for its being inserted in a hierarchical system of norms. 8 See TUORI, supra note 6, 300-304, showing the necessity for each legal-theoretical approach to (explicitly or implicitly) begin with the acceptance of a certain evaluative social theory. See As to the concept of law-making, this encompasses the mechanisms and procedures having legal recognition and directed to the production and enforcement of the law. This also includes the institutional actors (hereinafter "actors") participating in such production and enforcement. In other words, law-making refers to the operational aspects of the legal phenomenon, the mechanisms that make certain moral propositions or political declarations directly relevant, either in legislative or judicial forms, for the legal world and its actors. 11
C. Evolutionary Theory and Law: Readjusting The Legal Theoretical Perspective
Mentioning "evolutionary theory" in a legal environment or to a legal audience always creates the same kind of general reaction as mentioning Carl Schmitt's legal thinking: Most people will raise their eyebrows in skeptical disbelief. In both cases, the skeptical disbelief is somehow based on the presumption of some sort of association of these legal theoretical approaches to the idea of a natural selection as a basic mechanism for explaining and understanding the modern legal world. 12 
other words, Schmitt and evolutionary theory are not popular among lawyers and legal thinkers because they are conceived of as an attempt to introduce into the legal world a sort of Social Darwinism ideology, just slightly modified superficially in order to satisfy specific formal features of the legal phenomena. 13 For Schmitt, this skepticism most likely has a foundation. In the case of evolutionary theory, however, at least when dealing with the law and law-making in particular, this association is incorrect. This erroneous perception is mostly due to a deep terminological confusion and vague depiction shared by the legal audience, and therefore, it is necessary to provide certain readjustments as to what an "evolutionary approach to the law" is, especially when viewing it from the legal actors' perspective in relation to legal theory. 14 The first readjustment a legal theoretical audience needs to consider making is that it is necessary to distinguish between a theory of legal evolution and evolutionary theory and law. 15 Inside legal scholarship, a theory of legal evolution is a general label attached to all legal thinking aimed at discovering and explaining general patterns in Jurisprudence, 64 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 645, 646 (1985): "Self-consciousness and creativity, and not gene pools or chromosomes, constituted the essential ingredients in 'evolutionary' intellectual theories." Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory of continuity and change in the law. In this sense, the works of Henry James Sumner Maine, Oliver Wendell Holmes, or more recently of the economic approach, Peter Stein and Alan Watson, can be considered, for example, as presenting a theory of legal evolution. 16 Among the different theories of legal evolution, one can find an approach defined as evolutionary theory and law, to whose scrutiny this work is limited. The approach of evolutionary theory and law, under whose roof several schools can be grouped, is characterized in general by its attention to points of change and stability in the law through the centuries and among various legal systems. 17 "Evolutionary theory and law" distinguishes itself also for evaluating these aspects of the legal phenomenon from the point of view that Hart would define as typical of theories external to the law and its system: Luhmann's sociological theory on law (as in Europe) and biological evolutionary theory as metaphor or analogy for explaining the evolution of the law (as in the United States). 18 A second aspect legal scholars should also take into account, is namely that "evolutionary theory and law" is an evolutionary approach, in the sense of explaining changes in the law and legal system, but not necessarily also an 16 
"evolutionist" way of investigating the legal phenomenon. 19 From an evolutionist perspective, which for instance can be attributed to Marxist legal theory or a majority of Law and Economics scholars, the central points of investigating changes in law are both the mechanisms of legal evolution and the directions to which the law or some of its parts (e.g. torts law) are bound. 20 The "evolutionary theory and law" focuses its attention instead exclusively on the explanation of the mechanisms underlying the changes and continuities of a certain legal system (or part of it); this approach does not also explicitly designate the points of arrival to which such a system (or its parts) is somehow obliged to aim. 21 Finally, there is a third aspect of the idea of an evolutionary approach to the law to which the legal discipline should pay particular attention. This aspect has to do with the very object of the investigation in this approach, namely the evolution of the component of the legal phenomenon under scrutiny. At least if seen from a legal perspective, evolutionary theory applies neither to a single statute, a single judicial decision nor more generally to a single legal rule. 22 That actually under the spotlight of an evolutionary approach in general is more "legal concepts." 23 The Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory law-making cannot be identified by one single process leading to one single legal decision. It is more a question of several and usually chronologically asymmetrical processes leading to the production, often through several statutes and/or judicial law-making decisions, to a legal concept. The latter can be defined as a group (often scattered) of rules and normative regulations that aim, though their coordination and combination, at building an interaction responding to the criteria required by the rationality of the law. 24 Depending on several factors (legal system under consideration, theoretical assumptions of the observer and so on), the legal rationality can demand various requirements in order to be termed a legal concept, to be grouped either according to formal criteria, e.g. with the idea of consistency or coherence, or according to substantive criteria, e.g. economic efficiency or justice. 25 This product of the evolution process, namely the rationalized interaction of rules (legal concepts), forms a theoretical matrix with the primary classificatory and normative functions of helping primarily legal actors (but also often all actors dealing with the law) in diagnosing and systematizing legal problems occurring both in the creation and interpretation of the law. 26 For example, the legal concept known as joint custody is not composed of one single rule but rather is more a question of a coordinated (either by the same law-making authority or by doctrine) complex of rules imposing several duties and rights on both parents, child and the supervising public authority. 27 524 [Vol. 09 No. 04
As can be seen from this brief and necessarily rough sketch of the main claims by evolutionary theory and law (at least as perceived from a legal theoretical perspective), the skepticism that this approach encounters in legal theory is largely unfounded, or at least, is founded on the wrong ideas. To immediately connect evolutionary theory to a sort of social Darwinism explanation of the law and its making, i.e. an explanation justifying the dominant legal cultures and their paradigms (or principles) as being per se the best in a sort of deterministic way, paradoxically neglects the very evolution that the evolutionary theories have gone through. 28 As (critically) pointed out by an evolutionary scholar, "…[p]articularly in post-Darwinian views of legal evolution… there is a mixture of reliance on 'invisible hand' forces (economic conditions) and, particularly in later stages of development, a conscious adaptation of law to conditions. The latter is quite unlike the unconscious, mechanical adaptation found in Darwinian theory." 29 If one considers the basic ideas behind the modern evolutionary approaches to the legal phenomenon in particular, there are only two things they have in common with Darwin's original evolution theory and its subsequent distortions as a social theory. They both aim at finding some general explanatory model to clarify how complex phenomena such as an animal species or a legal system change. 30 Moreover, both Darwin and contemporary evolutionary approaches to law aim at pointing out that such changes always occur in multiple phases; the law and its parts, like the animal species and its parts, have continuous relations both with the surrounding environments and with their internal structures, relations which in the end determine the shape of the law as it does for the animal species. 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL 710, 712-713 (1916-17) 31 See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 18, 471. But see LUHMANN, supra note 14, 233, where the author distances himself (and in general the modern evolutionary approach to law) from the historical antecedents (e.g. Friedrich von Savigny) pointing out that "[e]volution is not a gradual, continuous, seamless increase in complexity but a model… compatible with radical erratic changes… and with long periods of stagnation." See also DEAKIN, supra note 7, 39. Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory
The basic feature characterizing the evolutionary approach to the law as "Darwinian" eventually is the same as that characterizing each legal theoretical approach to the law-making process: the attempt to explain the processes of lawmaking by taking into consideration not only the internal structures and different parts of a legal system, but also how these internal aspects relate and somehow "survive" the confrontation with the external realities in which the results of the evolution (e.g. a new law) are to exist. 32 As pointed out by Herbert Hovenkamp, "Jurisprudence was also "evolutionary" long before Darwin, and it continues to be evolutionary. Like most other intellectual disciplines, jurisprudence needs a theory of change…. Today every theory of jurisprudence worth contemplating incorporates a theory of change." 33 Having this common point with the theory of law-making, it is then worth investigating whether and, if so, what benefits can be derived by using the evolutionary approach to construct a theory of the lawmaking processes.
D. What Evolutionary Theory Can('t) Do For Legal Actors
The distinguishing feature of evolutionary theories, when applied to the legal phenomenon, is their focus on the various stages of the law-making process, namely variation, selection and retention. 34 As pointed out by several scholars, the focus of evolutionary theory is on legal change. 35 From the perspective of a legal actor, legal change is always identified with law-making, as long as the latter is intended in the broad meaning of the process of creation and implementation of certain legal concepts in legislative or judicial forms. 36 32 
For most legal actors in modern times, the very essence of the law and its normative nature can be traced by its being considered as binding by its addressees (or the community at large) regardless of the "empirical" surroundings, i.e. in its being perceived as an "Ought" regardless of the surrounding "Being." 37 Consequently, changes in legal systems or categories can only be achieved by producing other (alternative) legal systems or categories, i.e. only by making new and different laws. The sources for any legal change can naturally vary, from a changing economic reality pressuring for a better Ought to purely doctrinal developments within a legal system. Moreover, law-making (as legal change) can produce different and sometimes diametrical outcomes to the one planned. In any event, all legal actors agree that to change the law, one always eventually needs a new law or, as stated by Teubner, "[l]aw itself defines the preconditions of a legal act and thus the preconditions of every change in the law." 38 The explanation of how a legal act produces a new law is one of the central axioms of contemporary legal culture, and one of the major contributions of evolutionary theory. The insertion of the evolutionary approach (in its current version) into the world of legal thinking is very desirable in this regard, both as a theory of lawapplying and as a theory of law-making. As to the first, evolutionary theory still retains in both its European and American versions one of the fundamental aspects of the evolutionary theory as formulated by Darwin: evolutionary theory is a theory directed at explaining the present by looking at its past or, in other words, directed to answer the question of how we became what we are. 39 The basic goal for each evolutionary theory is then to provide legal scholars, law-makers, and last but not least, judges with clearer knowledge as to the background of the actual legal concepts in a certain legal system. 40 75 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 1117, 1157-1158 (1997) and his four stages at which an evolutionary theory can be a useful tool for the law-makers. See also TEUBNER, supra note 21, 49, where the author however limits the possible contribution of evolutionary approach to legal theory to a (rather obscure) Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory extent of a type of contract known as financial leasing. Evolutionary theory can show how financial leasing has been created, selected and stabilized as the best legal tool in order to promote specific activities inside the economic arena, namely in order to provide commercial actors with a broader range of facilities (e.g. perpetual new cars) for their work. Aware of this basic feature of financial leasing, judges then can, for instance, restrictively apply this legal concept, in particular when consumption is the main reason involved for signing a contract for financial leasing.
As to the second possible contribution to legal theory, the major focus of the evolutionary theory is on changes in the law; therefore it seems natural that this approach should be directed to that part of legal thinking that more than the others investigates the mechanisms and results of shifting from one legal regulation to another, namely the theory of law-making. 41 In other words, the contribution that evolutionary theory can offer to a theory of law-making becomes fundamental since, by its attention to the process of creation, selection and stabilization of a new legal concept, it shows how a certain change has taken place in the legal system. For example, evolutionary theory can visualize the importance of the economic discourse over the legal one in the law-making by showing the modalities through which financial leasing was able to penetrate progressively into many legal systems (in particular in civil law countries), despite the fact that these legal cultures did not originally have a third space between the rigid dichotomy of property rights and loans. 42 Despite these contributions that evolutionary theory can offer to legal theory, there is a fundamental problem affecting this approach that keeps it outside the legal theoretical tools each legal actor, from judges to law-drafters, always carries with him or her at work. While evolution theory can offer a better explanation of how past challenges have been solved by the legal system, it does not equip legal actors, as seen from their internal perspective, with criteria to face future challenges. As put by an evolutionary legal scholar, "it would be a fundamental mistake to evaluate evolutionary theories of jurisprudence as true or false. Jurisprudential idea of "discouraging" the faith in a possible "legal progress." But see the critiques in HUTCHINSON, supra note 1, 8-9. 41 See, e.g., Marshall S. 
theories are not true or false in the same sense that scientific theories are. Instead, we should judge evolutionary jurisprudence as we judge any creation myth, by whether it is useful." 43 The evolutionary approach to the law in its present form tends to not be so useful for legal actors because it does not take into consideration one of the basic points for a law-making in modern capitalistic society (at least according to Max Weber): its instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität), both in its substantive and more formal meaning. 44 According to Weber, instrumental rationality can be defined as the criteria leading to obtaining the result one is aiming to achieve by using the best means available, i.e. relative to the circumstances in a certain time and space. 45 The very changes in the circumstances (internal or external to the legal system) in which the law operates often force legal, political and social actors to activate the law-making. 46 Therefore, in order for an evolutionary approach to law-making to be taken to work by legal actors or, in other words, in order for it to become a "legal" evolutionary approach, it needs not only to explain the past but also to be directed into the future, in particular by elaborating a normative theory capable of helping law-making actors create, select and stabilize future legal concepts adapted to changed circumstances. 47 To summarize, evolutionary theory explains the change in the law and with this, it can be useful for lawyers, judges and scholars. However, this use by legal actors is heavily restricted by the fact that this approach tends to limit its attention to what 43 (1984) , and in particular the lack of space of "rational justification" in Weber's idea of rationality in law. 46 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 26, 669. But see Gordon, supra note 20, 36. 47 See BECKSTROM, supra note 13, 28-41, where the author develops the same kind of criticisms, though limited to the socio-biological version of the evolutionary approach to the law. See also Donald E. Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 113, 114 (1984): "The absence of a strong sense of its own past is a distinctive feature of legal scholarship... Legal scholars, imitating science, purport to be engaged in a quest for new knowledge which, if successful, would sweep aside the paradigms of their predecessors." Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory has happened. At the very moment a lawyer working for a drafting committee needs a general theory for some guidelines, i.e. in order to face a legal dilemma caused either by a change of the surrounding environment or by internal development to the legal world (using Luhmann's perspective), evolutionary theory as a possible legal theoretical first-aid kit fails, focusing on explaining what and why the change has happened instead of how to "remedy" it. 48 After all, one of the earlier scholars applying an evolutionary approach to the law stated, "I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them." 49 A major adjustment is therefore required in order to transform the "evolutionary approach to law" into a "legal evolutionary approach to the law" and, in this way, into a complete and legitimized member of the legal family under the forms of a possible legal theory for law-making.
E. Evolutionary Theory and Law: Re-adjusting The Evolutionary Perspective
The adjustment necessary in order for evolutionary theory to become a legal evolutionary theory of the law in general and law-making in particular, is caused by the fact that evolutionary theory was born in order to explain phenomena different from the law, or at least to explain the legal phenomenon from a non-legal perspective. 50 The evolutionary approach was born as a metaphorical or analogical reproduction of the results reached in the natural sciences and biology (as to some American versions of evolutionary theory) or as a (more or less) direct transposition into legal analysis of methodologies created for social and economic 48 See, e.g., BECKSTROM, supra note 36, 58-59, not giving any reason why law-making actors should opt for a conservative line instead of a more liberal orientation on the issue of succession law; or LUHMANN, supra note 14, 265, where the author points out the birth and development of a certain legal concept (self defense), at the same time failing to offer to future law-making or law-applying actors possible criteria on where to draw the line where the legal/illegal border ought to be drawn. See also Gordon, supra note 20, 68, 71 as to the "hidden" political agenda behind this lack of indication for the future law-making by evolutionary approach to the law. 49 See Holmes, supra note 7, 474. 50 See, e.g., STRAHLENDORF, supra note 17 26-27, 574, where the author points out his goal of developing an "evolutionary theory of law" which evaluates changes of the law from an external perspective, i.e. a point of observation grounded in socio-biological findings. See 
sciences (as for the European side of the coin). 51 As a consequence, evolutionary theory when applied to the legal phenomenon tends to disregard both the specific nature of its object of investigation (the law) and the fundamental role played in the very formation of this object by the (internal) perspective adopted by the legal players, among which legal scholars should be included. 52 One feature of the role of the legal discipline in the legal phenomenon in particular, as pointed out by Ross among the others, is its capability of changing the very 51 See TEUBNER, supra note 21, 52-53, pointing out the different roots between the European evolutionary approach (in the socio-cultural theories of evolution) and some fringes of the American evolutionary approach (in the socio-biological theories of evolution). As to the American version of evolutionary approach to the law, see, e.g., Elliott, supra note 1, 38-39; or Hutchinson, supra note 15, 262-265, where the author uses Darwin's image of species' evolution like a tree in order to explain the legal evolution. , 1996) , pointing out how the internal perspective of the legal actors is not so much a methodology, but the very subject matter of legal investigation. See also the accusation of "reductionism" as addressed to the evolutionary approach to the law in Blankenburg, supra note 3, 381. Another reason behind such lack of normative component can possibly be traced in the fact that evolutionary theory scholars want to clearly mark their distance from Social Darwinism and its "normative hypostasizations." TEUBNER, supra note 21, 51. See also SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, THE WOMAN THAT NEVER EVOLVED 12-13 (1981), as to the lack of a normative component as the feature distinguishing in general a Darwinian approach to the evolution from a Social Darwinist perspective. For example, some of the evolutionary approaches to the law stress the idea of "organicity" as underpinning criterion behind legal evolution. See, e.g., Smits, supra note 4, 81; or Robert Sugden, Spontaneous order, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW Vol. III 485, 488 (Peter Newman ed., 1988). This criterion of "organicity" is used in particular in order to promote the "spontaneous" judicial law-making (as to the American version of the evolutionary theory approach) or the non-state based law-making (as in the case of Smits) against the "creationist" legislative law-making. However, this idea tends to disregard the fact that there is never a spontaneous law-making, being the latter always the creation by institutional actors, either as National assembly or as a conglomerate of business organizations. Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory object of observation. 53 In contrast to most natural sciences, and to a more direct and higher degree than for most social and economic sciences, legal scholars can actually directly influence the choice of patterns of future development of the law. Legal categories such as 'contract', 'tort' and 'criminal' have all, for example, been the objects of intense theoretical writing and this theoretical literature has in turn had important influences on shaping directly or indirectly the functioning of the legal reasoning within each category. 54 In other words, one can also state that legal theory is not only a "theory of explaining and predicting" but also a "theory for design and action." 55 For example, by claiming the existence of a certain legal principle of efficiency inside tort law as an established "fact," law professors can actually force future generations of lawmakers and law-applying actors to introduce this principle, even if the original claim was false. 56 Using an epistemological vocabulary, it can be said that Karl Popper's criteria of falsification, at least when applied to legal theories, can (and often tends to) leave room for Robert K. Merton's idea of theory as capable of being a self-fulfilling (or a self-destroying) prophecy. 57 53 
See ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 47 (1959). See also Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 875, 894-895 (2002)
. But see LUHMANN, supra note 14, 252, where the author implicitly underestimates the power of "ideologies" on the legal thinking on law by pointing out the lack of a "general project" behind the evolution of the law. See also id., 270. See, e.g., Deakin, supra note 7, 26-29. 54 
This quality of the legal discipline in its turn has to do with the specific nature of the law: law is a human product aiming at regulating the relations of human beings with each other and with the surrounding environment. 58 As many legal scholars have pointed out, legal reasoning most of the time is a type of common sense reasoning, i.e. it often incorporates and uses moral, political, economic, or other kinds of values as criteria for regulating human behaviors. 59 However, legal reasoning has special requirements, due specifically to its normative and conflict resolution roles. 60 The regulation of human behaviors then is not based for instance on statements directed at convincing or persuading the addressees (as in politics). Legal reasoning is instead based on the use of specific language which, once it has transformed certain religious, cultural, moral, or economic values into legal concepts, indicates to the addressees (legal actors and/or the community at large) not models of behaviors they will "probably" embrace, but model of behaviors that the addressees "ought" to embrace. 61 As seen already above, if one considers legal theory as that part of the legal discipline directed at explaining the law and the functioning of a legal system, legal theory necessarily carries with it a normative component. This is formed by a REVIEW 75, 75 (1991) . 61 See KELSEN, supra note 25, 4. For this very nature of the law, i.e. its "Being" binding as normative system because of and according to its understanding by the human beings (legal culture), one cannot accept the basic assumption of the theory of legal memetic. According to the latter, the evolution of the law is based on a "three parties" relation, where legal concepts (as to the "genotypes" in natural selection or "replicator") take a middle position between the law ("organism" or the system under consideration or "interactor") and the surrounding context ("environment" or legal culture). See Deakin, supra note 7, 7-8, 30-32. Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory complex of statements made by the legal theoretician in which the latter indicates the direction in which legal actors "ought" to proceed in order to fulfill certain goals that "ought to be" in the legal system. 62 The indication of the "ought-to-be" goals can then be made by using a descriptive terminology, i.e. "by looking at the situation X, the addressee ought to behave as Y" (as for some modern legal positivists), or in prescriptive terms, i.e. "value X is good, and therefore the addressee ought always to behave as Y" (as for some critical legal theories). 63 In both cases, due to the very normative nature of the law, legal theory is always expected to contribute through its descriptive component to a better understanding of the past and present law. Modern legal theory is expected to always offer a normative component, i.e. a part in which the directions to be used for future law and law-making not only are indicated but are also "justified" as being the one that ought-to-be taken, for instance because they perpetuate the consistency and therefore the legitimacy of the legal system, or because by following it welfare will be maximized or gender discrimination will be eliminated. 64 62 See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 178, 199-201 (2001) . In particular, Coleman points out how scholars that state that every legal theory is normative, are right as long the term "normative" defines the feature of each theory of being "responsive to the norms governing theory construction." This meaning of normative, however, is not the (narrower) one that has been used throughout this work nor embraced by Coleman himself, i.e. normative theory as a theory defending a specific "ought" of the law. See LAW 73, 76 (2000) . Compare the shifting of Law and Economics from a hard line descriptive legal theory, such as in RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-15 (3 rd ed., 1986), to a more mixture of descriptive and normative components, such as in RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-374 (1990).
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Some followers of the evolutionary theory at this point could reply that the evolutionary approach, based on the investigations of how the law became what it is, actually devotes a relevant part of its analysis to future law and law-making. One fundamental component of evolutionary theory is its "predictivist" component, where evolutionary theory, by explaining how a certain legal concept has been created, chosen and "stabilized" in a certain legal system, also aims at being able to predict possible alternative patterns of creations of other legal concepts. 65 In other words, by explaining how a certain legal concept has established itself, evolutionary theory can predict how the latter will probably evolve and/or how it will be substituted. 66 For example, by looking at the history of financial leasing, evolutionary theory can predict that, in the future, the economic factors (namely the efficiency of a certain legal construction) in similar cases in the end will play a more important role than the formal legal factors (namely the lack of space inside a certain legal system for new types of legal concepts).
However, "predictions" are not "normative propositions," at least not explicitly. 67 The directions each legal theory offers legal actors are not predictions (at least not directly) of what will happen; they are "normative" directions, i.e. patterns that lawyers, judges and law-makers ought to take because they are (morally, politically, culturally, legally and so on) "the right thing" to do, often regardless of the surrounding legal, political, social, or economic environment. 68 Moreover, 65 See Hutchinson and Archer, supra note 17, 30. "A theory of legal evolution will be able to explain or even predict general structures of the law. 68 See HART, supra note 18, 132-137. See, e.g., ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 123 (1982) , where the author points out the often clashing relations between predictivist vision Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory normative propositions can have a direct performative force. 69 By taking the suggested normative patterns, and due to the very nature of the law as a human creation, legal actors are ultimately able to shape the law in a certain direction, regardless of all the possible predictions made by the legal scholarship. 70 A classical example is the concept of "separation based on race as inherently unequal," not considered a legal concept by legal actors throughout most of American legal history. It suddenly exploded as a legally relevant concept for interpreting the constitutional principle of the prohibition against discrimination (Equal Protection Clause) due to the legal landslide provoked by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown vs. Board of Education. 71 In other words, being predictivist in the legal world, i.e. the idea of being able to "objectively" determine possible evolutions of the law, can be quite a risky business. Law and its evolution (especially in its decisive moments) takes into serious consideration that which legal actors "subjectively" consider the law ought based on economic, political or purely systematic criteria. 72 For example, the 536 [Vol. 09 No. 04
conditions as to the issue of discrimination of the surrounding environments and of the legal system were roughly (and relatively) the same under Brown vs. Board of Education as they were more than fifty years prior under Plessy v. Ferguson, where the principle of "separate but equal" was sanctioned. 73 Nevertheless, the majority of the justices sitting in the Supreme Courts subjectively considered that the same text (Equal Protection Clause) meant the very opposite of that stated in Plessy v. Ferguson. 74 As a consequence, their normative accounts as to American constitutional law (it ought to prohibit separation) were not "predictable" (i.e. it was an uncertain outcome in light of the previous decisions and the factual situation). 75 Though unpredicted, the Justices' normative statements also became legal reality (constitutional law actually prohibits separation), setting the agenda for predictions as to future law-making on the legal concept of discrimination based on race. 76 Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory As pointed out by Hutchinson, "law will always be a relatively open ended and stylized form of politics in which 'anything might go'." 77 For this reason, and almost paradoxically, in order for evolutionary theory to become as predictivist as possible, i.e. to foresee which directions the law will take, it should itself explicitly provide legal actors with some normative criteria, i.e. offering directions that the law ought to take. This is actually one of the major goals of every legal theory and, in the end, the measurement of the theory's success or failure as such: the capacity to provide law-makers (when facing new realities) and law-appliers (when facing "hard cases") not only with a better picture of the present, but also to present normative criteria or somehow general analytical tools to face and master the future. 78
F. The "Ought-to-Be" in the Stages of Legal Evolution
The results and methodologies used by evolutionary theory as discussed above will then greatly benefit by being viewed by legal actors as a legal theory instead of a simple theoretical approach to the law. 79 Evolutionary theory will then, in particular, start to actually influence legal actors in their decisive role in lawmaking, and in this way render evolutionary theory's predictions more reliable. However, there is one step that needs to be taken: the integration of a normative component into evolutionary theory.
It is necessary to point out that this combination of evolutionary theory with normative proposals, rendering this approach also useful for legal reasoning, is not going to totally revolutionize this theoretical approach to the law. 80 The evolutionary approach to the law, despite its descriptive claims as to the present 14: "The widespread and unavoidable practice of providing after-the-event rationalizations to doctrinal innovations often obscures the historical process by which they were formed." 77 
and future law, already has some passages where the normative proposals play a crucial role. In other words, the need for a clear and explicit normative component of "legal" evolutionary theory is stressed by the fact that legal actors and their idea of what law "ought to be" participate in decisive (though not monopolistic) ways in all three stages through which, according to the evolutionary approach, the law of a certain legal system evolves. 81 Starting with the variation phase, i.e. the moment of creation of several possible legal concepts, this stage of the legal evolution is often commenced by factors external to the legal world, e.g. needs or changes occurring in the economic and political environments. 82 However, legal actors and the legal ideologies in which they are educated can still play a crucial role. 83 A classical example in this direction is Weber's analysis of the birth and growth in Western nations of the part played in capitalistic economic systems by the legal concept of the corporation. Weber's investigation shows how the legal world can sometimes itself create the various possible legal concepts, based primarily on internal needs of systematic character of the legal world (i.e. the "ought-to-be-done" proposals aiming at maintaining coherence inside the legal system). 84 Moreover, even if this is a variation induced by the external environment, it is almost always legal actors, due to the complexity of modern law, who create the new legal concept to be tested on the legal market. For example, even if the variation is induced by the request of the executive management of a large corporation for new types of contracts that facilitate the selling of their product in a foreign market, it is still the in-house attorney that 81 See TEUBNER, supra note 21, 56-59, where Teubner implicitly stresses the central role played (via the autopoietic nature of contemporary legal systems) by the legal actors' normative ideology in order to explain the evolution of the law in all the three stages. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 4, 280 where one of the roles of legal reflexive processes is the construction of value-criteria allowing certain legal measures instead of others. 82 See LUHMANN, supra note 14, 252; or Elliott, supra note 1, 38: "Law is a scavenger. It grows by feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing new ones of its own." It should be noted that the idea of a certain degree of autonomy of the legal evolution, in particular if one takes a more European (and especially Teubner's) stand on the issue, is strongly underlined by evolutionary theory. 86 This being the basic idea, one can draw the conclusion that evolutionary theory also tends to attribute to legal thinking a decisive role, not only in better understanding the legal evolution, since it explains the ideas according to which legal actors tend to reason. Evolutionary theory must also recognize that a legal theory, as a fundamental part in shaping legal culture, can decisively contribute to the development of the law into one direction instead of the other, in particular in its normative component. As recently stressed by Sinclair, "[t]hat the variation or selection mechanisms in a developing system involve rational agency does not preclude an evolutionary explanation; however, it may diminish the value of such explanation." 87 Second, as far as the selection phase of the law-making is concerned, even here the ideological apparatus of legal actors has a decisive role, at least in contemporary Western or "Westernized" national, transnational, and international legal systems. As also stressed by the followers of evolutionary theory approach to the law, a fundamental function in determining what the law is, i.e. in selecting the "winning" legal concepts among the various proposals, is played by the basic ideas as to the issue of "what is law" and "what is not-law" of the legal actors, such as legal staff working for law-makers or judges of international courts of arbitration or international lawyers of multinational corporations. 88 These normative structures or ideas have the fundamental task of legitimizing certain solutions (instead of others) to legal problems as "legal" and therefore binding the addressees or at least the parties. 90 Therefore, the recognition of this crucial role of legal culture should also encourage evolutionary theory to take a step further and provide lawyers, judges and legal scholars with normative patterns, i.e. with directions as to what road to take and explanations why the proposed directions ought to be taken. 91 As evolutionary theory's studies constantly point out, lawyers and judges are certainly not the only actors participating in the process of selection. For instance, non-legal actors also play a fundamental role by using a certain concept such as "corporate interest" regardless of whether it is formally sanctioned as legal, simply because it helps to protect "the public interest in profitability of the enterprise." 92 However, the very construction of the idea of relevant legal concepts is based on their acceptance as part of the valid law and valid legal system, which, in their turn, are based on two fundamental elements. In case of conflict, i.e. when the legal system is facing the selection of the surviving legal concept, one institutional actor (e.g. the court of arbitrators or the law-making authority) is chosen to decide what concept is part of valid law (and therefore binding) and what is not. In other words, the past that animates the common law, but a selective account of it… [according to] the specific values and commitments that inform the process of distillation" made by the judges and lawyers." Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory one actor is assigned with the specific task of selecting which legal proposal, among those promoted by the conflicting parties or group interests, has to be considered valid law (or according to the valid law). The performance of this task also brings with it the (implicit or explicit) consequence of quashing all non-compatible solutions as "not legally valid" and therefore as non-binding for the addressees. 93 Moreover, at least in Western or Westernized legal systems, the individuals comprising this institutional actor in charge of the selection are usually educated at law faculties and (most of the time) have certain experience working either as lawyers or judges. 94 As a consequence, and paralleling the selection taking place in the surrounding environments, there is still a need for the non-legal actors to "win" the crucial selection taking place in the legal arena so that, for example, their economically efficient concept can always be used with binding force against all the parties. This victory can be obtained only by selling their winning products in terms of the culture in which legal actors have been educated for their jobs, either as judges, lawyers or legal staff working for the law-makers. 95 For instance, the selection taking place in the economic surrounding can certainly choose financial leasing as the most economic efficient tool for both parties. However, in order to become law, the parties need to sell to the legal institutional actors the tool of financial leasing as a legally possible variation (e.g. based the legal criterion of ex analogia legis) of the already legally legitimized concept of loan.
Finally, as to the stabilization (or retention) phase of the evolution of the law, the normative legal culture, i.e. the culture of legal actors as to what ought to be the law, here too plays an important role, though more discrete than during the two other phases. In the stage of retention of a newly formed legal concept, at first blush the legal ideology as to what is law is not the dominating factor in order to explain how and why a certain selected legal concept becomes a stable part of the body of national, transnational, or international law. Decisive at this stage are the practices 542 [Vol. 09 No. 04
taking place mostly in the surroundings of the legal arena. These can be, for example, the appraisal of a certain type of contract as being "efficient" for the financial market in the economic arena, or a certain idea of human rights as including private property, helping to promote the political liberal ideology in the political arena.
However, though these non-legal assessments are important in order to stabilize certain legal concepts, they all still tend to be paralleled or supported by the legal reasoning. The latter's use by non-legal actors aims above all at strengthening the non-legal arguments by also pointing out the validity, i.e. the very existence as binding law of a certain type of contract or a certain idea of human rights. After all, as pointed out by Luhmann, "[t]he specification of the way in which arguments refer to legal materials in the legal system [i.e. the legal reasoning] is the true carrier of the evolution of the legal system and the breakthrough to an autonomous culture." 96 In particular the in case of an uncertain situation, i.e. circumstances where conflicting non-legal values are at stake, legal arguments are used as decisive factors in promoting the stabilization of value A instead of B not only for being economically efficient but also for being incorporated in the valid law. 97 The importance of the legal culture at all three stages of the production of new legal concepts is due to one of the features of modern legal systems (even at the transnational level), especially in relation to the surrounding environment: the specialization of law. 98 As a result of the increasingly detailed "marking out of what counts as legal knowledge, legal reasoning and legal issues," one can detect the progressive marginalization of all other discourses from the mechanisms of lawmaking, as well as their substitution by the specific knowledge and discourses provided by specific actors, the legal actors. 99 Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory For example, the relations between law and politics are nowadays heavily influenced by one typical feature of the welfare state, namely the increasing use of secondary legislation (or administrative rule-making). 100 This supremacy of delegated law-making, in its turn, tends to distance the legal discourse from the political control exercised by political actors such as national or local assemblies and, instead, promotes the role of ("undemocratic") actors such as legal experts working for administrative agencies. 101 Similarly, the growth at the transnational level of new types of laws (e.g. international labor law or the law of commercial transactions) is characterized by the very domination, in both its law-creation and law-implementation, of legal actors such as international courts of arbitration panels or multinational corporate attorneys. 102 It is possible to state in general, as put forward by Luhmann, that nowadays a force influences the relations between law and its surrounding environments in such a way that the role of non-legal actors operating in legislative bodies (e.g. political representatives) almost appears no longer to be one of creating law but simply choosing among the bulk of legal concepts already available and produced by legal expertise through the centuries. 103 Legal reasoning and its normative nature then is not only an important part in all three stages of the legal evolution as presented by evolutionary theory, but it is also a reality of contemporary law and law-making. 104 As pointed out by Dworkin, Evolutionary Theory and Law to Legal Evolutionary Theory evolutionary approach to the law into a legal evolutionary approach. 110 This integration means that evolutionary scholars must explicitly offer to legal actors the evaluative cornerstone to be chosen as an axiomatic term in the normative reasoning; as in the previous example, a legal evolutionary theory needs to explicitly state whether and why the criterion C separating law from non-law, for instance, is the one of justice, or the one of economic efficiency, or the one of formal consistency within the legal system. 111
G. Conclusion
The main purpose of this article has been an attempt to reallocate the evolutionary approach to the law within the family of legal theory and, in this way, render it an instrumental methodological device in order to better understand law-making in modern times. After having briefly sketched in the first part the fundamental terminology used in this work, the second part presented the evolutionary approach from a legal theoretical perspective. The skepticism displayed by the legal audience towards this methodology (especially in its European version) has been shown generally to be unfounded, the evolutionary theory having the same research program as every legal theoretical approach to the law-making process.
The third part identified, however, the main obstacle to complete acceptance of the evolutionary approach to law as a tool for legal actors: the lack of an explicit normative side, where lawyers, law-makers and judges can retrieve "ought" criteria to be used for deciding in which directions future law-making should proceed. In the fourth part, the necessity of normative proposals has been especially highlighted for a theoretical approach such as the evolutionary one, that aims not only in explaining the past and present of the law, but also in making predictions for its future development. Due to the capacity of legal theories to have a direct performative force by influencing law-makers, it has been shown that the evolutionary approach can reach a higher degree of accuracy in its predictions by becoming a "legal evolutionary theory," i.e. by offering also normative criteria the very law-makers can use for taking future decisions.
Finally, the fifth part highlighted that this integration of normative proposals will not revolutionize the evolutionary approach, the "ought-to-be" culture of legal actors already having a central role in all the fundamental mechanisms behind legal change as described by this approach.
To conclude, since law is a human product and human beings do not always act in predictable ways, the goal here is simply to render the evolutionary theory into a theory more appealing to legal actors. In this way, it can be used to understand not only the actual legal reality but also its potential developments by channeling them in more predictable patterns. Regardless which choice of normative components can be considered best, e.g. self-produced or borrowed from more established legal theories such as legal positivism, two elements have to be considered for further discussion. First, the passage from an "evolutionary approach to the law" to a "legal evolutionary theory" is essential, due in particular to the fact that by applying a certain theory to the creation of new laws, legal actors can immediately mould the evolution of the legal phenomenon. Second, a necessary step in order to make this transition into "real" legal theory is certainly equipping the evolutionary approach with a normative side, since in the end legal actors search in legal theory not only for a clearer description of their reality, but also for a clearer guidance in face of difficult decisions. 112 At the end of the day, as pointed out by Thomas Kuhn for each theoretical approach in general, the ambition of being "the" theory of law, i.e. the one that sets the agenda for the discussions in the house of law, is also a part of the very DNA of the evolutionary theory. 113 Evolutionary theory then needs to first set up a permanent residence in this house by becoming member of the legal family. The easiest way to do this is probably by marrying someone, such as, for example, modern legal positivism, who has already been living there for a long time.
